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Judging War Crimes
Patricia M. Wald*
I. SOME BACKGROUNDI n November 1999, after twenty years as a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, I began serving as a judge on the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). The ICTY
was established under a United Nations Security Council Resolution in 1993; its
jurisdiction is limited to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations
of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It also has
temporal and geographic limitations; these crimes must have been committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia on or after January 1, 1991. Practically, that
jurisdiction covers any of the four categories of international crimes committed
between 1991-95 among the various Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, or Yugoslav armies
or paramilitary units, as well as the more recent violence in Kosovo. The ICTY has
fourteen judges elected for four-year terms by a majority of the U.N. General
Assembly from a list of candidates generated in the Security Council; no more than
one judge can come from a single country. The current judges come from the United
States, France, Italy, Great Britain, Australia, Jamaica, China, Morocco, Egypt,
Guyana, Portugal, Zambia, Malaysia, and Colombia. The Statute of the ICTY
provides for the imposition of prison sentences on convicted war criminals but no
death penalty.
The formal working languages of the ICTY are French and English, although
typically trials also involve a Serbo-Croat dialect since that is the native language of
most witnesses and defendants and many defense lawyers. The three courtrooms are
high-tech, allowing for simultaneous video and audio translation among the different
languages. The court is organized into three Trial Chambers of three judges each and
an Appellate Chamber of five judges. The Appellate Chamber also hears appeals from
a separate similar Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR'), which tries crimes committed in Rwanda emanating from its genocidal
episode in 1994. The same Prosecutor investigates and prosecutes crimes before both
the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals.
The ICTY is housed in a grim, high security, converted insurance building in the
commercial section of The Hague. The building has no adornments; judges have their
own offices, sparsely furnished, a secretary down the hall and one legal assistant
(federal judges enjoy, by contrast, considerably more spacious quarters including a
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bathroom, at least one secretary within calling distance and two to four law clerks).
There is a senior legal assistant assigned to each of the four ICTY Chambers.
Since the ICTY has no police force of its own, it must depend on other countries
or international peace-keeping forces to deliver the suspects it indicts. As a result, in
the ICTY's first three years, 1993-96, no trials were held since it had no suspects in
custody (the Tribunal does not conduct trials in absentia). It did, however, indict over
ninety defendants for war crimes. Despite a disappointing lack of cooperation in
apprehending indictees from the governments of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and the
Republika Srpska, the number of suspects in physical detention at The Hague has
escalated in the last several years. Some indicted persons have surrendered voluntarily;
some have been captured and handed over by supporters of the ICTY such as Austria
and Germany; and some have been apprehended by U.N. peacekeeping forces. A few
have even been extradited from Croatia and Bosnia. As a result, as of February, 2000,
thirty-four accused were in the ICTY's detention unit on the outskirts of The Hague,
and thirty had been publicly indicted but were not yet in physical custody. Thirteen
accused were at the appeal stage, one had finished trial and was awaiting judgment and
sentencing. Two were on trial, while twenty were in pre-trial proceedings. The ICTY
is now a very busy court; indeed, its chief operational problem is bringing detained
defendants to trial within a reasonable time. The ICTY employs 832 persons from
sixty-eight countries, the bulk in the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry (which
arranges for witnesses, defense counsel, and supervises detention); its annual budget
has grown from $276,000 in 1993 to $94 million in 1999.1
The ICTY is not uncontroversial. Some commentators contend that unless it is
able to try the "big fish," political leaders like Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan
Karadzic or military commanders like Ratko Mladic (all of whom have been indicted
but not taken into custody) it cannot be judged a success.2 Serb and Croat critics
question its impartiality because its major support comes from NATO countries and
most of the defendants are Serbs or Croats. Still others point to the small numbers of
accused actually tried and to the long periods of pre-trial detention that are becoming
increasingly frequent as more suspects come physically under ICTY control. Some
commentators and policymakers believe that reconciliation, not vindication, is the
preferable route to pursue in the aftermath of civil wars. It is safe to say that any final
judgment on the ICTY's legacy is still on hold.
II. SOME FIRST IMPRESSIONS ABOUT JUDGING AT THE ICTY
At this writing, I have been a member of the ICTY less than six months and,
first impressions may be undependable. But there are several marked contrasts with
my twenty years on the federal bench that merit comment.
1. ICTY website: <hrtp//www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm> (visited Mar 4,2000).
2. However, several of the military leaders allegedly in the next tier of command, such as Serb General
Radislav Krste; General Stanislav Galic, and General Momir Talic, are in custody, and former
Croatian General Timohir Blaskic was sentenced to forty-five years on March 3, 2000.
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A. Different Missions
The missions of the two courts are different in important ways. In simplified
terms, the job of a federal court of appeals is to assure that the district trial court or
the federal agency has not made some egregious error in finding the relevant facts, and
then to apply the proper legal standard to those facts to arrive at as close an
approximation to individual justice as our system allows. Yes, we often have to
interpret ambiguous statutes, precedents, and even the Constitution, and to fill in
interstices that the law has purposely or inadvertently left open. In most cases,
however, we have guidelines aplenty in statutory text and legislative history, prior
cases in our own and other courts, and commentators galore to fill in important voids.
Our main aim is to apply law to each new case that is consistent and coherent with a
mature jurisprudence, but still allows for its continuing adaptation to novel situations.
At least that is the way I tried to write my 830 opinions for the D.C. Circuit; on the
few occasions where I went astray-by the sights of my colleagues or the Supreme
Court-I was set straight.
At the ICTY, there are two major differences in that scenario. As the first court
to systematically apply international criminal law to individual defendants since the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II, the Tribunal has three tasks:
the first, not dissimilar to that of national courts, is to find what really happened (who
did what, when, where, and why), and then to apply norms of international law in
deciding the culpability of and punishment for the implicated individuals before the
court (more on this subsequently).
Its second task is to flesh out and develop, and sometimes to weave from many
disparate strands the international norms themselves. Except for Nuremberg, Tokyo,
and isolated instances of war crimes prosecuted in national courts, there is a dearth of
precedent actually applying the mandates and bans of the myriad of treaties,
conventions, practices, treatises, and learned commentaries that make up what we call
international law. The unexplored territory is vast. In this regard, it is interesting that
the ICTY and ICTR have themselves spawned over 300 articles in the international
journals, more than any other topic in international law in the last decade. This
tedious, but essential task, of creating almost from scratch an entire body of relevant
precedent about the way humanitarian norms in times of war-some centuries old-
are to be applied when an individual defendant's freedom is at stake is something most
domestic courts need not face. This body of law further must comply with the
fundamental principle nullum crimen sine lege (that is, that no one can be convicted of a
crime that was not defined as such at the time he or she acted).3 In other words, the
Tribunal is charged with applying existing law, not making up new law. But the
details of this "already existing" law are not laid out neatly in cases and legislative
materials directly on point, but must be extracted from an amorphous body of legal
3. Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
UN Doc § 25704 para 34 (May 3,1993).
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materials of varying relevance and specificity. Thus, the Tribunal has had to decide,
often for the first time in any court, questions like: What proof suffices for the special
intent that the crime of genocide, much deplored but so little prosecuted, requires?
When, if ever, can the duress of an immediate threat of losing one's own life justify
following an order to execute an innocent civilian? When does a practice or a goal of
some but not all civilized nations become a norm of international law so that it can
serve as the basis for a prosecution.
The third function of the ICTY is a unique one, also not duplicated in ordinary
criminal courts. That is to memorialize for history the factual story of what happened.
The Tribunals' prosecutions are typically not of the "what did person X do to person
Y" variety. Usually, they involve major events in the Bosnia (or Kosovo) conflicts-
the running of the detention camps where atrocities against women and civilians took
place over months, even years; the forcible removal of thousands of residents from one
location to another; the use of, non-combatants as human shields in battle; mass
executions; and, the plundering of whole villages. Often many defendants involved in
the same sequence of events are tried jointly, and hundreds of witnesses may have to
be called to establish that these horrors actually occurred. Already articles have begun
appearing in the international media challenging the numbers and even the fact of
mass graves in Bosnia and Kosovo. The results of widespread scientific explorations
and the inferences to be drawn from intensely detailed findings about bone fragments,
primary and secondary grave sites and soil differences, the significance of the frozen
time on watches worn by the corpses and other issues are disputed in many trials.
Many historians as well as the relatives of victims maintain that only the adjudicated
findings of an impartial international body of jurists following accepted rules of legal
procedure will quell the doubts of future generations that the terrible things did in fact
happen. To chronicle accurately for history some of the world's darkest deeds is the
special responsibility of the Tribunal. Many would say it explains and even justifies
the extraordinary length of the Tribunal's judgments and what sometimes appears to
be the Tribunal's near-obsession with minute factual detail.
B. Different Rules
A federal judge's awesome powers are usually defended on the ground that she
must abide by the rules laid down by the Constitution, statutes, and her own court.
Thus the judge conducts a trial according to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
adopted by the Supreme Court with the tacit approval of Congress, as well as
interstitial local rules of her own circuit. Though labeled procedure, every
knowledgeable judge and lawyer knows the Rules are often outcome determinative
and control what happens in the courtroom just as much as does the substantive
criminal law. But there is no one tidy set of volumes containing clear text and
explanation of what international law considers a criminal offense and how it must be
judged or defended. That must be discerned from treaties and conventions, cases
decided in different countries under different judicial systems, learned treatises and a
potpourri of other sources.
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The ICTY has had to establish its own Rules of Procedure; its judges have done
so in plenary session over the past nine years. There are now over 100 such Rules-
many amended several times as a result of experience-covering relationships with
national courts and states having custody over suspects, the investigation and
detention of suspects, the arraignment of indictees, assignment of counsel and other
rights of defendants, pre-trial discovery, provisional release pending trial, execution of
arrest warrants, protection of victims and witnesses, depositions, preliminary motions,
rules of evidence, and appellate proceedings.
The judges of the Tribunal have the final word on its Rules, and because of the
different cultures from which the fourteen judges come, the Rules reflect a
combination of common law and civil law procedure. For example, trial is before a
bench of three judges who may find by a majority that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 An acquittal can be appealed by the prosecution. Pre-trial
discovery of the prosecution's evidence by the defendant is far more liberal than our
American rules permit.6 The presumption is in favor of detention not pre-trial
release.7 The Tribunal has a requirement that evidence be "relevant" and "probative"
but nothing like our complex hearsay rules.8 Trials are conducted basically in an
adversary mode with cross-examination of witness by counsel but judges may not only
question witnesses on their own but call for additional witnesses or evidence sua
sponte. There is no jury or grand jury but an indictment must be confirmed by ajudge
to whom supporting material must be shown, and that material must soon thereafter
be turned over to the defendant." The accused may, but need not, take the stand, and,
even if he chooses not to testify, he is allowed to make an unsworn statement at the
start of the proceedings." The Tribunal, as yet, recognizes no binding precedent in its
own or other courts' decisions.
Apart from the formal rules, there are other sui generis aspects of an ICTY trial,
compared to the American model. The witnesses in war crime trials generally come
from one of the formerly warring countries or regions, and their susceptibility to
intimidation and threats in their home territory is far more common than in domestic
trials. Often they must be provided safe passage through hostile countries to get to
The Hague in order to testify; they frequently request and often must be given
elaborate guarantees of protection from public disclosure of their identities. Their
travel and stay in The Hague must be arranged and paid for by the U.N. Defendants,
defense counsel, witnesses and even the judges may speak different languages, yet
under the Rules the defendant must be apprised of charges and the evidence against
4. ICTY Rule 98ter(c).
S. See, for example, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-I-A (July 15, 1999).
6. Compare ICTY Rule 66 with FRCP 16.
7. ICTY Rule 65.
8. ICTY Rule 89.
9. ICTY Rule 98.
lo. ICTY Rule 47; Rule 66(A)(i).
11. UN Doc § RES/827 (1993) (the ICTY Statute), Art 21.
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him in his own language." The defendant may retain his own counsel, but in most
cases counsel is assigned and paid for by the Registrar of the Tribunal. Even the
inquiry into whether the defendant has insufficient assets of his own so as to qualify
for assigned counsel is complicated by distance, language differences, and often the
refusal of the local authorities to cooperate in such an inquiry. Some of these defense
counsel are not accustomed to cross-examination and must be specially trained. When
defense counsel also come from a hostile country, there are special dangers of witness
intimidation. Joint trials of defendants involved in the same episode-though
procedurally desirable-must sometimes be foregone because only one defendant is in
custody and a non-cooperative country will not apprehend or transfer the other to the
Tribunal. Most of the trials conducted so far have taken a year or more. While clearly
that record must be substantially improved upon in order for the Tribunal to do its
job of trying war crime suspects without infringing their rights to fair trials within a
reasonable time, the obstacles recounted make that undertaking a formidable one, Of
late, the ICTY is trying to pursue more effective pre-trial conferencing and is looking
into ad hoc judges, more liberal provisional release, and more flexible use of its trial
judges.
C. Different Dynamics
Any judge serving on a multi-judge court soon learns what a major role the
unwritten dynamics of the court play in its daily operations and overall efficiency. The
way in which cases are assigned, the relationship among the judges, their commonality
or diversity of background and outlook, the privileges of seniority, the protocol for
drafting and reviewing opinions, even the personal agendas and ambitions of the
judges can affect a court's workings. I perceive strong differences in court dynamics
between my old court and my new court. I will discuss a few.
1. All fourteen ICTY judges come from different judicial systems; although
English and French are the working languages of the Tribunal, many judges speak
only one of those languages easily. In the courtrooms, translations are instantaneous
and pose no problem to a minority-language judge, but in more informal settings,
where the majority language usually prevails, the minority-language judge tends to be
at somewhat of a disadvantage in engaging in give and take among the panel judges.
Each judge may draft herjudgments, orders, and memos in the language of choice, but
translations into the other language may not be forthcoming for several days, inflicting
an inevitable delay in response time. And there are frequent instances in which
differences arise as to whether the essence of the original version has been preserved in
the translation. Plainly, fluency in both working languages would make for a more
efficient operation all around.
2. The Tribunal is organized into three Trial Chambers of three judges each,
with one judge elected as presiding head by chamber-mates. An appellate Chamber of
12. ICTY Scat Art 21.
(Vo1 l NO.1o
five judges is headed by the President of the Tribunal, elected by the entire body. The
three judges in each Chamber must sit on every trial together (no changing of panel
mates monthly as in the D.C. Circuit), so that in the past, each chamber conducted
only one trial at a time (some Chambers are now conducting two trials
simultaneously). At present, judges are not freely transferred from one chamber to
another. Because the ICTY trials are typically so long, however, the three judges are
tied up for months before they can begin another trial; and of course opinions (known
in the ICTY as judgments) cannot be written until the trial is over. Thus I found as a
new judge, my time was initially somewhat underutilized while chamber colleagues
finished up ongoing trials and wrote lengthy judgments. This kind of hiatus rarely
happens in the federal courts; trial judges run their own individual calendars and can
adjust their schedules to stay busy at all times; at the appeals level, a new judge can
usually be slotted into another panel or new panels can be created at will to hear
pending cases. On my appeals court, we heard up to four appeals a day, so there were
always opinions waiting to be written, and motions'panel judgments to fill in any
spare time. It may be that rigid adherence to the Chambers structure will have to be
revisited as the number of defendants awaiting trial escalates.
3. Although I have only had the experience of these six months, my impression
is that the presiding judge retains more control over the proceedings than in my
former court where his main function was to call time and occasionally decide the
order in which competing colleagues questioned counsel. The presiding judge in
ICTY trials makes rulings from the bench-usually in consultation with co-judges; all
the judges may ask questions during trial but usually according to a protocol set by the
presiding judge. It is not quite the spontaneous free-for-all arguments that
characterize the D.C. Circuit bench. Originally, the ICTY Rules provided that judges
would be rotated on a regular basis between Trial and Appellate Chambers, but in
practice this produced too many disqualifications on the appellate level ofjudges who
had participated in the trial of the same case. Now the regular rotation has been
dropped, but disqualifications still require substitution ofjudges on particular appeals;
I am involved in one such appeal now. In either case, there is the slightly awkward
situation of a relatively small number of judges sitting both as trial and appellate
jurists and ruling on each others cases. It should also be noted that experience in
running a criminal trial is not an explicit requirement for the job; I concededly had
none. Still it bears thinking whether the running of vastly complex trials of multiple
defendants lasting a year or more with hundreds of witnesses should not be reserved
for jurists with trial experience. Conceptualizing and analyzing intricate points of
international law is a vital part of the job, but as the dockets grow full, the ability to
move the trial along to judgment becomes just as important a qualification, and that, I
submit, does benefit from experience.
4. In federal appellate courts, the drafting of opinions is usually assigned by the
presiding judge to a single judge; that judge's draft is then reviewed by panel members
and later circulated to the court as a whole. In the D.C. Circuit, we did, however, have
one class of cases-very complex regulatory cases or criminal conspiracies-where the
Spring 2000
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panel would divide up the writing chore. In the ICTY cases, the judgments are
typically long, some run over 300 pages. They are written either by several judges in
charge of different parts or (shades of the law clerk debate in the United States) by a
team of the Chamber's junior and senior legal assistants and then amended, edited,
and revised by the judges themselves. Judgment writing at the ICTY may take
months. When the judgment is issued, it is signed by all three judges with no
identification of the authors of the particular sections, though the cognescenti in the
courthouse generally can identify who wrote what. There may, of course, be
concurring and dissenting opinions which are directly attributable to their authors.
This process does, I believe, make for a less personalized form of adjudication, and
some might argue that the lack of personal credit (or blame) makes the author less
motivated to produce her personal best. Add the fact that the original judgment will
be in one language, with the translation handled by Tribunal staff. It is not surprising
then that most judgments appear to place a premium on fact-finding, long
justifications of the choices in law to be applied and meticulous citation of the varied
sources where the "law" may be found. There is little rhetorical phrase-making, and
most opinions follow a stylized format that defies individual differences. It would be
relatively difficult for any judge to build his reputation as a brilliant writer or even
analyst on the basis of the opinions in which he participates at the ICTY, I have a
feeling that a single identified author of ICTY opinions might make for more
conciseness, even in some cases more coherence, but in the longest cases it would take
its toll in terms of an impossible workload on the judges and even possibly detract
from the commendable lack of egocentricity I find in the judges.
5. This leads me to my last-elusive but I think genuine-difference in the
dynamics of the two courts on which I have sat. Judges on the ICTY-disparate as
their backgrounds and cultures may be-are non-ideological about their commitment
to the goals of the court, fair treatment of defendants, truth in fact finding for histor/s
sake, and development of international criminal law as a practical and feasible tool for
deterrence of wartime atrocities in the future. They may differ on the significance of a
particular rule implementing those goals, but they are united on fundamental notions
of what the role of the court is, and on whether the acts alleged deserve punishment.
Because the judges will within relatively short periods return to their native countries,
they do not appear to invest primary career ambitions in their Tribunal tenure; many
like myself have already completed their main judicial careers; others are performing a
public service but do not see their current stint as the launching pad for the next
judicial promotion. As a result, there is a stronger sense of common cause than on
some American courts, less jousting for the next judicial rung on the ladder, less
emphasis on establishing ones self as primus among peers; in short, there is more
opportunity for genuine collegiality. Whether in the long run that produces a more
effective and productive court, I do not know but expect to find out in the next several
years. For my part, I find it both exciting and humbling, at this stage in my career, to
experience this new and important, even exotic, opportunity to serve.-
.ofiWO. I
